Risks in the swaps market by Elizabeth Laderman
FRBSF WEEKLY LETTER
Number 93-10, March 12, 1993
Risks in the Swaps Market
Since its inception in the early 1980s, the market
for the financial instruments called swaps has
grown phenomenally. As of December 1991, the
latest date for which data is available, the under-
lying notional principal on all outstanding inter-
est rate swaps with payments made in dollars
was about $1.5 trillion.
As the market has grown, so has the role of banks,
both as principal parties, to the swaps and as
intermediaries. This latter role, in particular, has
raised concerns among regulators about the risks
swaps pose, not just to the banks involved, but to
the financial system as a whole. This Letter dis-
cusses these potential risks and concludes that
most of them are adequately managed and con-
trolled. The exception may be the "systemic" risk
ofa financial shock being transmitted throughout
the financial system thro~gh the swaps market,
though the significance of this risk is unclear. To
the extent that it is of concern, it could be miti-
gated by imposing more rigorous reporting of
swaps transactions.
An interest rate swap
There are many kinds of swaps, for example,
currency swaps and equity swaps, but the most
popular kind is an interest rate swap. An interest
rate swap is a contract under which two parties
agree to exchange floating and fixed interest
payments on a stated amount of principal. The
principal, called a "notional principal," is used
merely to calculate the reciprocal cash flows be-
tween the counterparties and usually is not itself
exchanged.
Counterparties have different reasons for entering
into interest rate swaps, but one of the most com-
mon isto hedge interest rate risk. Imagine a firm,
say a thrift, that has short-term liabilities such as
3-month certificates of deposit (CDs), and long-
term, fixed-rate assets, such as 30-year fixed-rate
home mortgages. If interest rates rise unexpect-
edly, the thrift will lose money, because the inter-
est rate that it pays on its CD liabilities will rise,
but the interest rate it receives on its mortgages
will not. Conversely, the thrift will benefit when
market interest rates fall. Now imagine a second
firm whose assets yield a return that fluctuates
with market interest rates, but whose interest
payments on its liabilities are fixed for a longer
period of time. This firm will lose money when
interest rates fall and make money when interest
rates rise.
Both parties can reduce their sensitivity to inter-
est rate fluctuations by entering into an interest
rate swap with each other. In this example, the
swap contract specifies that the thrift, which has
fixed rate assets, will essentially take over some
ofthe interest payments ofthe second firm,
which has fixed rate liabilities. The second firm
will take the opposite position, using its returns
on its floating rate assets to take over some of
the floating interest payments of the thrift. For
example, ifthe thrift's CDs have interest rates that
fluctuate with the 3-month Treasury bill interest
rate, it can agree to pay the second firm a fixed
rate of, say, 6 percent, on an agreed upon princi-
pal in exchange for a floating rate payment of the
3-month Treasury bill rate on the same principal.
Often, the fixed rate, 6 percent in this example,
is determined by the interest rate prevailing at
the time that the swap is originated on a security
of equal maturity to that ofthe swap, say the
10-year Treasury note rate.
Of course, finding a match for a swap can be as
hard as finding a match for a marriage, and this
is where intermediaries come in. While many
banks are themselves principal parties in the
swaps market, large banks are more extensively
involved as deal-makers, or intermediaries. Inter-
mediaries typiCally act as counterparties them-
selves, thereby "making a market:' and earn
profits by receiving higher fixed rates than they
pay. For example, say a bank stands between the
two counterparties by requiring that the thrift pay
it, say, 6 percent plus 50 basis points and then
passing on only 6 percent to the second firm.
Price and credit risk
When assessing the profitability of acting as a
swap dealer, a bank will likely take into account
the risk that it faces. There are two major kinds of
risks banks consider. The first is price, or market,
risk, which means that if interests rates change,
the bank may lose money. For example, if theFRBSF
bank as intermediary is receiving a fixed rate and
market interest rates rise, then, the bank's coun-
terparty's fixed-rate payment is below the new
market rate and the bank loses money on what
was, at origination, a "fair trade."
Because the bank's main purpose as a dealer is
to earn a positive bid-offer spread (the difference
between the fixed rate received and the fixed
rate paid), it will attempt to hedge its swap po-
sitions with a combination of offsetting swaps,
futures, options, and Treasury securities. Ideally,
these hedges offset the bank's cash outflow (in-
flow) on the various swaps with a cash inflow
(outflow) of equal magnitude. However, most
bank dealers find that they cannot perfectly
hedge their positions at all times, and, conse-
quently, they face some risk from changes in
market interest rates and spreads.
The second major type of risk that a bank faces
as a swap dealer is credit risk, the joint risk that
the bank's counterparty defaults and that interest
rates or bid-offer spreads have changed in the
bank's favor since origination, so that the de-
faulted portion ofthe swap would have had posi-
tive economic value. For example, if the bank is
receiving a fixed rate and market interest rates
decline, then the counterparty's fixed-rate pay-
ment is above the new market rate. If thecoun-
terparty defaults, the banks loses the benefit of
those above-market rate payments.
There is no complete hedge against the credit
risk that a bank faces as a swap dealer. However,
certain common practices generally do provide
some protection against credit risk. For example,
intermediaries can choose to deal with relatively
low-risk counterparties and reject relatively high-
risk counterparties or require them to collateralize
their swap position. And, unlike a collateralized
loan, where the lender cannot liquidate the col-
lateral following the filing of a bankruptcy pe-
tition, the collateral underlying a swap may be
liquidated. In addition, swap contracts with
maturities over ten years generally specify that if
either counterparty falls below investment grade,
the other counterparty has the right to liquidate
the swap at its market value at that time, while
the deteriorating counterparty still is solvent.
Also, most or all bank dealers have formal limits
to assure that credit risk exposure is not exces-
sive. For example, most banks set a limit on their
total credit exposure, arising from any of a vari-
ety of financial arrangements, to anyone coun-
terparty. Banks also may have a lower exposure
limit for riskier counterparties.
Risks as seen by the regulators ,
Regulators' main concerns with regard to risk are
the expected liability to the deposit insurance
fund and "systemic risk;' the risk of a destabiliz-
ing disruption ofthe financial markets. Further-
more, the concern with respect to deposit
insurance arises only as a result of "excessive"
risk-taking on the part of a bank which either is
deliberately exploiting the deposit insurance sys-
tem by increasing its positive deposit insurance
subsidy or simply is ignorant of the risks that it
may be undertaking.
The swaps market may offer banks some oppor-
tunities for exploitation of the deposit insurance
system. Specifically, banks can leave their swaps
unhedged and thereby speculate on interest rate
movements, or they can engage in swaps with
unusualiy risky counterparties. The latter strategy
might be followed if swap pricing is such that the
expected return on a swap is higher the riskier is
the counterparty, as is the case at some banks.
However, such behavior is not likely to be wide-
spread. For example, other instruments, like
Treasury securities, tend to have lower transac-
tions costs and also can be used to speculate on
interest rate movements. In addition, the strong
predominance of relatively low-risk counterpar-
ties suggests that the use of swaps as high-credit-
risk, high-payoff ventures is not widespread.
Therefore, it is likely that excessive risk-taking
with swaps, if it exists, usually is unintentional.
Whether intentional or not, however, regulators
have recognized the risk inherent in swaps and
have taken it into account in the new risk-based
capital requirements for banks. These rules re-
quire that, at a minimum, a bank hold capital
equal to 8 percent of "risk-adjusted assets:' They
reduce incentives for risk-taking through swaps
by including swaps in the calculation of risk-
adjusted assets. The requirements state that half
of the sum of (1) 0.5 percent of the notional prin-
cipal of a swap with a life of more than one year
and (2) the market value ofthe swap, if it is pos-
itive, is to be included in risk-adjusted assets.
(If the value of the swap is negative, the market
value is treated as zero for purposes of comput-
ing risk-adjusted assets.) Thus, investment in aswap requires some commitment of capital, and
this reduces the risk of bank failures because
capital acts as a cushion against losses.
The capital requirement also reduces the possi-
bility of a destabiliiing disruption to the financial
markets as a result of "systemic risk" from swaps.
Systemic risk in this context means that a bank
could become insolvent, perhaps for a reason
that has nothing to do with swaps, but, because
swaps dealers tend to have numerous swaps
deals with each ofthe other dealers, a problem
at one bank could be transmitted to other banks
and ultimately cause multiple failures.
Narrowly interpreted, this scenario would re-
quire that swap losses really be large enough to
cause insolvency, that is, to deplete capital. This
is unlikely. In one recent study, total actual losses
from default on swaps were estimated to be
about two-one hundredths of a percent of the
outstanding notional principal amount. Because
the average notional principal amount of a swap
contract is about $25 miiiion, potential losses on
individual swaps can be estimated to be about
$500,000. Of course, some banks inevitably will
face larger actual losses and others smaller. How-
ever, the minimum amount ofcapital held by the
major bank swaps dealers is about $1 billion,
and most hold considerably more. Therefore, it
seems unlikely that swap losses, at least as a re-
sult of counterparty default, could by themselves
cause a bank to fail.
However, there is a broader interpretation of the
systemic risk problem in connection with swaps.
The swaps market is a web of interrelationships,
but those interrelationships are obscured to both
the market and regulators because there is no of-
ficial record of swaps transactions; This means
that swaps could exacerbate contagion problems,
wherein a strong external shock such as a sud-
den extreme change in interest rates or a global
stock market crash, causes financial market
gridlock because of a lack of information. Speci-
fically, market participants may not be able to
identify accurately which banks are in danger of
failing as a result of such a shock, and, conse-
quently, financial contracting may stall until
swaps and other interrelationships are sorted out.
Moreover, financial market disruption may be
widespread because the "derivatives" market as
a whole, of which interest rate swaps are a part,
extends into many other markets, such as foreign
exchange, commodities, and stock markets.
Despite the apparent gravity of such problems,
the true significance of this risk remains unclear.
Nevertheless, it is important to consider what
might be done to address such a problem. In
other interbank financial markets, such as the
federal funds market and the interbank deposit
market, as well as in other financial markets,
such as the stock market, participants report
transactions on a real-time basis to the Federal
Reserve, to some other regulator, or to an ex-
change. If swaps participants also reported their
transactions, then swaps contracts could be
traced to sort out counterparties' obligations,
thereby minimizing any financial market disrup-
tion resulting from a shock to the financial
markets.
Conclusion
Risk in the swaps market has attracted much at-
tention recently. A review of the nature of. swaps
contracts and their risks shows that banks' own
risk management, the risk-based capital require-
ments, and the relatively low default rate on
swaps make it unlikely that swaps will, by them-
selves, transmit problems that result in insolven-
cies from one bank to another. However, because
ofthe relative opacity ofthe interrelationships
within the swaps market, swaps might exacer-
bate contagion problems and systemic risk, al-
though the true significance of even this risk in
the context of swaps is debatable and requires
further study. SHould such risk be deemed signif-
icant, it could be mitigated by requiring partici-
pants to report all swaps transactions on a timely
basis. However, the advisability of such a re-
quirement depends not only on a more detailed
assessment of the likely benefits, but also on in-
put from swaps participants themselves regarding
the likely costs of such reporting and its impact
on the vitality of this important market.
Elizabeth Laderman
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